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The media in China has undergone extensive commercialization to become
more market-driven over the last 35 years. Based on a sample of over two
million newspaper articles, this study investigates whether the media in China
has an incremental impact on stock price eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that: as media
coverage of a ﬁrm increases, (1) its stock price synchronicity decreases; (2)
the probability of informed trading of its stock increases; and (3) the extent
to which its stock price deviates from random walk decreases. Our inter-
regional analysis over thirty-one provinces/regions within China reveals that
the eﬀects of the media on decreasing stock price synchronicity, increasing
the probability of informed trading, and reducing stock price deviation from
random walk are stronger in regions of weaker institutional development.
Our ﬁndings suggest that a market-driven media can play the role of compen-
sating for the underdeveloped governance institutions in transitional econo-
mies such as China.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In transitional economies such as China or Russia, agency problems are severe but the standard governance
institutions to protect investors and maintain transparency are limited and weak (e.g., Allen et al., 2005). With
investor protection weakened and transparency reduced, stock prices are likely to become less informative
because they are less able to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (Jin and Myers, 2006). The resulting
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investments (Tobin, 1982).
In such an institutional environment, can the media play the role of compensating for the weak standard
institutions to improve stock price eﬃciency? Our study investigates this hitherto unexplored question in the
context of listed Chinese ﬁrms. Our analysis focuses on the impact of ﬁrm-level media coverage on three
dimensions of stock price eﬃciency: (1) the ability of stock price to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information;
(2) the collection of private ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in stock trading (i.e., the extent of informed trading);
and (3) the extent to which stock prices deviate from random walk (i.e., pricing error).1 In an inter-regional
analysis across 31 regional/provincial jurisdictions within China, we also directly test our compensating hypoth-
esis that the eﬀect of media coverage in increasing stock price eﬃciency is stronger in regions (or countries) with
weaker standard governance institutions.
We are motivated to study the eﬀect of ﬁrm-level media coverage in China on stock pricing eﬃciency for at
least two reasons. First, La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that in countries where standard institutions are weak,
substitutive or compensating mechanisms (such as concentrated ownership) may develop to sustain ﬁnancial
activities.2 As the largest transitional economy in which standard institutions for investor protection and dis-
closure transparency are either underdeveloped or still in the developing stage, China provides arguably the
best laboratory setting in which to identify compensating mechanisms.3 Our investigation in eﬀect assesses
whether the media can act as a compensating mechanism to increase stock price eﬃciency.
Second, Morck et al. (2000) ﬁnd that Chinese stock prices are less able to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation than most other stocks in a 40-country sample.4 Jin and Myers (2006) as well as Hutton et al. (2009)
show that the ability of stock prices to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is lower in countries with poor
investor protection and low ﬁrm-level transparency. In the case of China and other transitional economies,
these two related factors stem from the underdevelopment of standard governance institutions. This institu-
tional underdevelopment results in weak legal enforcement, lax ﬁnancial regulations, poor disclosure quality,
insuﬃcient information intermediation, poor external monitoring by ﬁnancial analysts, independent auditors,
institutional investors, or credit rating agencies. Since the development of standard governance institutions is
necessarily a gradual process, the potential compensating role of the well-established and increasingly market-
driven institution of the Chinese media warrants research attention.5
Our empirical strategy involves developing two measures of ﬁrm-speciﬁc media coverage based on over two
millions newspaper articles written about all listed ﬁrms in China and published in 14 national ﬁnancial news-
papers and the 10 largest comprehensive newspapers in China in the period of 2000–2009 and identifying three
empirical proxies for stock price eﬃciency, which are the inverse of stock price synchronicity, the probability
of informed trading (PIN), and stock pricing error. Our results reveal the following.
First, we ﬁnd that as the media coverage of a ﬁrm increases, the ability of the ﬁrm’s stock to incorporate
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information improves. Second, we ﬁnd that as the media coverage of a ﬁrm increases, both the
probability of informed trading and the probability that a private information event occurs in its stock
increase. Third, we ﬁnd that as the media coverage of a ﬁrm increases, the extent to which the ﬁrm’s stock1 To the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to examine the relation between ﬁrm-level media coverage (in China or elsewhere)
and stock price eﬃciency. There is, however, a growing literature which looks at the relation between non-media institutions and stock
price eﬃciency (e.g., Kim and Shi, 2012; Haw et al., 2012; Ferreira et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2010; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Fernandes and
Ferreira, 2009; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Jin and Myers, 2006; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000).
2 La Porta et al. (1998) use both the words ‘‘substitute” (p. 1116) and ‘‘compensate” (p. 1140) to describe these mechanisms relative to
‘‘complement” mechanisms. We prefer the word ‘‘compensate” because these mechanisms cannot completely substitute for legal
institutions, but they can ‘‘compensate, at least in part” (p. 1140).
3 China ranks poorly in the ranking of countries in terms of rule of law, corruption, and the protection of property rights (La Porta et al.,
2004; Pistor and Xu, 2005; Allen et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010).
4 Given that China is the second-largest and fastest-growing economy and that it attracts the largest amount of foreign capital, the
inability of Chinese stocks to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into their prices is an important concern, particularly from the
perspective of foreign equity investors. For example, the fraction of U.S. pension money invested in emerging markets with
underdeveloped legal systems such as China is growing rapidly (Dyck et al., 2008, p. 1094).
5 See next section and Appendix C for detailed arguments.
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that ﬁrm-level media coverage can increase stock price eﬃciency.
Fourth, to alleviate concerns about potential endogeneity, we apply the propensity score matching (PSM)
procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). We ﬁnd that our results from the PSM analysis remain qualitatively
identical with our main results using the full sample. Fifth, to alleviate concerns about the potential impact of
liquidity on our results, we conduct a further sub-sample analysis by dividing the main sample into sub-
samples of liquid and illiquid ﬁrms. We ﬁnd no evidence that variations in liquidity drive our results.
Finally, we test our compensating hypothesis directly by investigating whether the observed eﬀect of media
coverage on stock price eﬃciency diﬀers systematically across 31 diﬀerent provincial/regional jurisdictions of
diﬀering institutional development within China. Our results show that: (1) stocks of ﬁrms located in regions
of weaker institutional development are less price eﬃcient as expected; and (2) the eﬀect of media coverage in
increasing stock price eﬃciency is stronger (weaker) in regions within China with weaker (stronger) institu-
tions. These results are in support of the hypothesis that institution of the media is able to play the role of
compensating (or substituting) for the underdeveloped standard institutions normally expected to provide
investor protection, maintain transparency, and thus increase stock price eﬃciency.
Our study adds to the extant literature in two ways. First, this paper contributes to the stock price eﬃciency
literature by identifying the eﬀect of a hitherto unexamined factor, namely ﬁrm-level media coverage, on the
eﬃciency of stock prices. In so doing, we provide useful insights into the channels through which the media
can impact the eﬃciency of stock markets. Second, our paper contributes to the investor protection literature
by showing that the media can play the compensating role of protecting investors and maintaining trans-
parency in transitional economies such as China where standard institutions normally expected to perform
these functions are relatively weak and underdeveloped.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background discussion of
the media in China. Section 2 develops our empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the data and measurement
of key variables. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 5 sets forth our conclusions.2. Empirical predictions
2.1. Does media coverage enhance stock price eﬃciency?
Research on the role of media coverage in ﬁnancial economics is relatively recent. There are two strands of
the literature relevant to this paper. The ﬁrst deals with how media coverage aﬀects stock prices. Klibanoﬀ
et al. (1998) ﬁnd that country-speciﬁc news reported on the front page of The New York Times makes the price
of closed-end country funds moving to fundamentals more closely and quickly. Tetlock et al. (2008) show that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc qualitative information in news articles can help predict earnings and stock prices. Fang and
Peress (2009) ﬁnd that investors demand a premium in stocks with no media coverage: They attribute this ﬁnd-
ing to a lower level of ‘‘investor recognition” (Merton, 1987) of stocks with low media coverage due to their
lower level of relative information completeness.6Hillert et al. (2012) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with media coverage exhi-
bit stronger momentum.
The second strand of the literature deals with the watchdog function of the media. The question typically
asked is whether more ‘‘sunshine,” resulting from more media coverage translates into more investor protec-
tion. In a sample of U.S. ﬁrms whose accounting practices were challenged and sanctioned by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Miller (2006) ﬁnds that media coverage played a role in the early identiﬁ-
cation of accounting fraud. Dyck et al. (2008) show that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the
probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed in Russian ﬁrms. Dyck et al. (2010) show that the
media was responsible for ‘‘blowing the whistle” on between 17% and 24% of corporate frauds in the U.S.
between 1996 and 2004. Two important and related implications arise from these studies. First, more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ‘‘sunshine” resulting from more ﬁrm-level media coverage can improve investor protection6 In other words, media coverage of a ﬁrm increases the relative ‘‘investor recognition” of its stock because it increases the stock’s
relative information completeness.
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the ﬁrms covered (the reputation eﬀect). Second, better investor protection improves the information environ-
ment of the ﬁrm by improving governance. With better governance, ﬁrms become more transparent because
they have less to hide (Leuz et al., 2003).
Combining these two strands of research and extending them, we conjecture that stocks of ﬁrms with more
media coverage are more price eﬃcient because there is more ﬁrm-speciﬁc information available in the market
about these stocks. The underlining rationale is that these ﬁrms are more transparent and investors of these
ﬁrms enjoy better investor protection (Jin and Myers, 2006). First, ﬁrm-level media coverage generates more
ﬁrm-relevant public information. The resultant enforcement and reputation eﬀects improve ﬁrm-level
governance and thus ﬁrm-level transparency accordingly (Leuz et al., 2003). Second, media coverage provides
more investor protection through the watchdog function of the media. Better investor protection is critically
responsible for encouraging investors to collect more ﬁrm-speciﬁc private information before they trade on a
stock. With more information and higher transparency available, any deviation of a transaction stock price
from the eﬃcient price (i.e. stock pricing error) would become smaller and disappears more quickly.
2.2. The media in China as a watchdog?
Because of its ability to monitor and expose corporate wrongdoing, the media in the U.S. have been viewed
as a watchdog for small investors (e.g., Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2010). That is, the watchdog function, if car-
ried out eﬀectively, should increase ﬁrm-level transparency and improve investor protection, resulting in
improvements in the ﬁrm-level information environment and stock price eﬃciency. Moreover, the watchdog
eﬀect of the media is expected to be comparatively greater when other standard investor-protecting institutions
(such as the courts) are underdeveloped (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998).
In the Chinese context, standard investor-protecting institutions are weak (La Porta et al., 2004; Allen
et al., 2005; Jiang et al., 2010) and the media institution is much better developed (Liebman, 2005; Lin,
2008). Thus, it is of interest to ﬁnd out whether, and to what extent, the media in China can perform the
watchdog function. At the outset, it is not apparent whether the state-controlled (i.e., non-independent)
Chinese media can ever be a watchdog for small investors. However, the discussion in Appendix C about
the media reform in China over the last 35 years suggests that the situation is more nuanced and reveals that
a strict dichotomy between media independence and non-independence is not informative of the evolving
Chinese media. Speciﬁcally, two factors are worth noting.
First, there has been a change in the media information paradigm as the media model in China changed
from a propagandist model to a commercialized model, resulting in not only more information, but also more
diversiﬁed information, conveyed to the public by the media.7 The change in the media model reﬂects the fact
that the legitimacy basis of the ruling Party has changed from one of communist ideology to one of economic
performance; it also explains the Party’s permanent retreat since the early 1990s on news reporting in the
lifestyle-related white zone (see Appendix C, Footnote 21).
Second, the near-complete ﬁnancial autonomy, the demand for credible and reliable information from the
public, and competition among news media force most newspapers in China to become responsive to the
information demands of the subscribing public. In particular, strong market competition and the increasing
dissonance with a dying ideology have caused Chinese journalists to focus more on the battleground of gray
zone news reporting, covering wrong-doing, fraud, corruption, and other unfair actions at the regional and
corporate levels (see Appendix C, Footnote 22).
Based on the discussions above and in Appendix C, we conjecture that the media in China are able to perform
a limited watchdog role at the regional and corporate levels for two main reasons. The ﬁrst (arising frommarket
logic) has to do with the strong market incentives unleashed by commercialization that motivate the media to
push the limits of what is allowed. The second reason (arising from ‘‘Party” logic) is related to the congruence
between the Party-state’s overall interests in sustaining economic development as well as maintaining social
stability at the national level and curbing corruption as well as fraud at the regional and corporate levels.7 By a ‘‘commercialized” media, it is meant that the media receives little or no state subsidies and must rely on private subscription and
advertising revenue to survive in the marketplace. In short, a commercialized media needs to be market-driven.
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these ﬁrms are more transparent and there is more informed trading of these ﬁrms’ stocks. As a result, there is:
(1) more ﬁrm-speciﬁc information being incorporated into stock prices; (2) more private information being
transmitted to the public through informed trading; and (3) the deviation of a transaction stock price from
the eﬃcient price being reduced. We therefore hypothesize in alternative form:
H1a. Media coverage of a ﬁrm is positively associated with the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
incorporated into its stock price, measured by the inverse of stock price synchronicity, all else being equal.
H1b. Media coverage of a ﬁrm is positively associated with the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc private information
available, measured by the probability of informed trading in the stock market, all else being equal.
H1c. Media coverage of a ﬁrm is negatively associated with the deviation of a stock price from the eﬃcient
price, measured by stock pricing error, all else being equal.2.3. Does institutional development matter?
Because investors normally rely on legal and other governance institutions for protection, these institutions
are important to both the development and eﬃciency of the stock market (La Porta et al., 2000).8 Evidence
from Morck et al. (2000) suggests that poor investor protection increases the cost and risk of collecting ﬁrm-
speciﬁc private information on the part of investors, and thus makes stock prices less informative. La Porta
et al. (1998) present evidence to suggest that in countries with a weak legal system, compensating institutions
(such as concentrated ownership) may develop to sustain ﬁnancial activities.
Similar to La Porta et al. (1998), we argue that the incremental impact of the media as a compensating insti-
tution in providing investor protection is likely to be greater in countries (or regions within a country) where
extant institutions that are normally expected to perform such functions are less developed. For example, the
incremental eﬀects of media coverage on investor protection and transparency are likely to be weaker in the U.
S., the most developed market economy with mature institutional infrastructures, than in China, where insti-
tutional infrastructures are much less mature. Similarly, the incremental impact of media coverage is likely to
vary in accordance with the extent of institutional development across 31 provincial/regional jurisdictions
within China itself. Thus, the regional variation in institutional development within China provides an
opportunity to test our hypothesis directly by examining the interplay between the role of the media and that
of non-media institutions in inﬂuencing stock price eﬃciency. The compensating hypothesis on the role of the
media suggests that the association between media coverage and stock price eﬃciency is likely to be stronger in
regions of relatively weaker institutional development. We hypothesize in alternative form:
H2. The associations of media coverage with (a) stock price synchronicity, (b) ﬁrm-speciﬁc private
information available, and (c) deviation of a transaction stock price from the eﬃcient price, are more
pronounced in regions (or provinces) with relatively weaker institutional development, all else being equal.3. Data and variables
3.1. Empirical measures of media coverage
To test hypotheses H1 through H2, we need to construct empirical measures of ﬁrm-level media coverage in
the Chinese language setting. This poses challenges, particularly because no previous research has addressed8 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), for example, distinguish ‘‘contracting institutions” (which support economic activities among ﬁrms
and/or individuals) and ‘‘property rights institutions” (which protect individuals and investors from expropriation by corporate insiders
and politically powerful persons or organizations). However, these authors ﬁnd that both sets of institutions are required to support the
development of stock markets.
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ies (e.g., the commonly used General Inquirer’s Harvard-IV-4 classiﬁcation dictionary) are available to mea-
sure diﬀerent types of media coverage in English (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009), in this
study we must develop our own for the Chinese language media.
To avoid subjective interpretations and to include as large a coverage range as possible, we choose to focus on
generalmedia coverage based on newspaper articles written about every listed ﬁrm (excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms) in
China and published in all 14 national ﬁnancial newspapers and the 10 largest comprehensive newspapers by cir-
culation in China from 2000 to 2009.10Tominimize measurement errors, we use a task-speciﬁc computer search
program to download these articles. This approach has several advantages. By focusing on general media cov-
erage, we need not decide subjectively whether coverage is positive or negative and how positive or negative it is.
In addition, the ability to include a wide range of media coverage enables us to capture both the information
enlargement eﬀect and the information dissemination eﬀect (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011), both of which sup-
port thewatchdog/oversight function of themedia.Moreover, this approach is justiﬁed becausewe are interested
in how the watchdog function of media coverage (as opposed to how a speciﬁc type of coverage) facilitates ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information ﬂow or improves information-based trading in the stock market.
Speciﬁcally, we take the following three steps to construct a data set containing media coverage of listed
ﬁrms using the WiseNews database.11 First, for each ﬁrm in our sample, we download articles that mention
the name of the ﬁrm for each ﬁrm-year after ﬁltering out articles generated by the ﬁrm in question (e.g., various
ﬁrm-generated announcements and reports). Here, our objective is to exclude self-generated media coverage.
Second, for each ﬁrm-year, we count the number of articles that mention the name of the ﬁrm and denote
this total asMediaCov1. Although articles that mention the name of a particular ﬁrm in question may or may
not be about the ﬁrm, the number does capture the publicity dimension of media coverage of the ﬁrm and
enhances its ‘‘investor recognition.” To ensure that an article is about the ﬁrm, researchers in U.S.-based stud-
ies normally rely on a ‘‘relevance score” provided by a classiﬁcation dictionary in English. Fang and Peress
(2009), for example, retain an article containing a ﬁrm’s name if the article’s ‘‘relevance score” is 90% or
above. Since there is no classiﬁcation dictionary in Chinese to rely on, we use a diﬀerent empirical strategy
in the next step.
Third, in each article, we count the number of times the name of the ﬁrm in question is mentioned and the
number of times that the name of each of all listed ﬁrms in China is mentioned in the same article (if any).12
For example, for given ﬁrm in a given year, we may ﬁnd that the name of the ﬁrm in question (Firm A) in an
article is mentioned 3 times, but the name of another ﬁrm (Firm B) is mentioned 5 times in the article, and the
name of yet another ﬁrm (Firm C) is mentioned 6 times in the same article. We keep an article only if the name
of the ﬁrm in question is mentioned more times than any other names on the assumption that this article is
therefore likely to be about this ﬁrm. In other words, we would drop the article about Firm A in our example
even though the name of Firm A is mentioned 3 times, because Firm B (Firm C) is mentioned 5 (6) times. We
then re-count the number of articles in each ﬁrm-year and denote this total as MediaCov2.
By construction,MediaCov1 measures media coverage of a ﬁrm by all articles that mention the name of the
ﬁrm in question, whereas MediaCov2 measures media coverage of a ﬁrm by articles in which the name of the
ﬁrm is mentioned most often. While the MediaCov1 captures the publicity or ‘‘investor recognition” dimen-
sion of media coverage, it is very likely that not all these articles are written about the ﬁrm. In comparison,
MediaCov2 is more likely to capture articles actually written about the ﬁrm, though this measure may still con-
tain measurement errors. To the extent that both measures are likely to contain articles not actually written
about the ﬁrm, they are biased against researchers ﬁnding signiﬁcant results.139 To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst attempt to empirically measure ﬁrm-level media coverage in China.
10 Miller (2006) ﬁnds that, as far as ﬁnancial frauds, the ﬁnancial press tends to produce more original information, whereas the
non-ﬁnancial press tends to repeat information already reported elsewhere.
11 WiseNews is a Hong Kong-based electronic news clipping service that provides access to news from about 550 newspapers and
magazines published in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau.
12 In our sample of 2,144,850 articles, the average number of listed ﬁrms mentioned by name in an article is 6.
13 Manually reading through the 2,114,850 articles in our sample is not feasible and would be subject to the uncertainty of subjective and
inconsistent interpretations.
J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 83–114 893.2. Empirical measures of stock price eﬃciency
To enhance the validity of our ﬁnding on the impact of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency, we assess
stock price eﬃciency from three diﬀerent but inter-related dimensions using three measures: (1) the ability of a
stock price to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information as measured by the inverse of stock price synchronicity
developed by Morck et al. (2000), (2) the amount of private ﬁrm-speciﬁc information about a stock available
in the stock market as measured by the probability of informed trading (PIN) developed by Easley et al.
(1996), and (3) the deviation of a transaction stock price from the eﬃcient price as measured stock pricing
error developed by Hasbrouck (1993).
Stock price synchronicity, denoted by SYNCH, reﬂects the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
incorporated into stock prices through informed trading. High synchronicity of a stock indicates that its price
reﬂects more common information relative to ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, or a less informative stock price.14
The probability of informed trading denoted by PIN, is used to capture the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc private
information available in the stock market. Previous empirical work generally supports the use of PIN as a
valid measure of the probability of informed trading (Vega, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and
Laux, 2007; Ferreira et al., 2011).15 Following Hasbrouck (1993) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we
measure a stock pricing error (V(s)/V(p)) as the dispersion or standard deviation of the extent to which a
stock price deviates from random walk (V(s)), scaled by the standard deviation of the stock price itself
(V(p)). Appendix B provides detailed explanations on procedures used to compute all measures mentioned
above.
3.3. Empirical measures of institutional development
H2 concerns whether and how non-media institutional development across regions aﬀects the impact of
media coverage on stock price informativeness. To test H2, we need to obtain empirical proxies for the
strength of institutional development across the economically fragmented 31 regions/provinces within
China.16 Given that administrative regions or provinces in China typically exhibit large variations in eco-
nomic and institutional development, Fan et al. (2009) construct institutional development indices for each
province to capture the eﬃcacy or strength of institutions at the provincial level within China.17 These
indices, ranging from small (bad) to large (good), include: (1) overall market-institution development
(denoted Inst_General); (2) government intervention in markets (denoted Inst_Gov); (3) private enterprise
development (denoted Inst_Private); (4) regional protectionism (denoted Inst_Protectionism); (5) ﬁnancial
market development (Inst_Financial); and (6) legal environment (denoted Inst_Law). Since the above
indices capture diﬀerent aspects of the strength of regional institutions, we use them all, one by one, to
test H2.
3.4. Other variables
Exact deﬁnitions and sources of the key variables above and other control variables used in the paper are
provided in Appendix A. Financial information needed to construct non-media and non-institutional vari-
ables is collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.14 This measure has been used in a large number of studies to measure ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, including Piotroski and Roulstone
(2004), Chan and Hameed (2006), Ferreira and Laux (2007), Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), Gul et al. (2010), and Ferreira et al. (2011).
15 To avoid the eﬀects of order ﬂows, we also discompose PIN into the probability of a private information event occurring (ALPHA)
and order ﬂows and focus on ALPHA alone (see Appendix B for details).
16 The problem of regional economic fragmentation within China has been described as ‘‘one country, thirty-one economies” (Huang,
2003, p. 141).
17 Periodic reports based on these indices have been compiled by the National Economic Research Institute of the China Reform
Foundation since 2001. These indices are used to gauge the varying degree of ‘‘marketization” across regions within China. Academics are
beginning to use these indices to conduct China-based research (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2012).
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
Panels A and B of Table 1 show the extent of media coverage about our sample ﬁrms by year and industry,
respectively. Overall, there are a total of 2,114,860 (499,876) articles when media coverage is measured as
MediaCov1 (MediaCov2) written about our sample of 9613 ﬁrm-years over the period 2000–2009. On average,
there are 220 (52) articles per ﬁrm in a year when media coverage is measured as MediaCov1 (MediaCov2).
Given that there are, on average, 220 articles per ﬁrm in a year, a listed ﬁrm on average gets its name
mentioned in an article at least once in a few days in any given year. Because all ﬁrms in our sample are listed
and the range of our media coverage is quite extensive, there is no ﬁrm in the sample that received no media
coverage in any given year. As shown in Panel A, the extent of media coverage per year (MediaCov1) appears
to increase over time, with a low of 108 per ﬁrm in 2000 and a high of 307 per ﬁrm in 2008, though there is no
clear trend. As shown in Panel B, more than half the ﬁrms in our sample are in the manufacturing industry.
Firms in the mining industry tend to have the greatest media coverage, though there appears to be no signif-
icant diﬀerence in the distribution of coverage per ﬁrm by industry, irrespective of whether the coverage is
measured by MediaCov1 or MediaCov2.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. The mean and median of the R2 for the market model speciﬁed in
Appendix B are 0.4082 and 0.4027, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.1635, suggesting that the
R2 is reasonably distributed. The R2 for our Chinese sample is relatively high, reﬂecting that Chinese stocks
tend to co-move more closely with common factors rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors.18 Consistent with the R2
statistics, the mean and median of SYNCH are 0.4193 and 0.3939 with a standard deviation of 0.7035,
much higher than for the U.S. sample of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), who report a mean and median syn-
chronicity of 1.742 and 1.754, respectively. This again suggests that Chinese stocks are more synchronous
than U.S. stocks. The mean and median of PIN (ALPHA) in our sample are 0.1383 (0.3304) and 0.1398
(0.3340), respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.0600 (0.1259), suggesting PIN (ALPHA) is reasonably
distributed. The mean (median) of V(s)/V(p) in the sample is 0.1156 (0.1079), with a standard deviation of
0.0531, similarly suggesting a reasonable distribution.
With respect to descriptive statistics on other variables, the following are noteworthy: First, the mean for
Private Firm of 0.317 indicates that about 32% of our sample ﬁrms are non-state-controlled listed ﬁrms, while
the rest are state-controlled ﬁrms. Second, about 8% of our sample ﬁrms issue both A-shares for domestic
investors and B-shares for foreign investors. Third, about 2% of our sample ﬁrms issue both A-shares and
H-shares traded on the Hong Kong stock market. Finally, on average, each of our sample ﬁrms is followed
by about one analyst.
Fig. 1a–d is graphic illustrations of the relations between MediaCov1 in deciles and the corresponding
SYNCH, PIN, ALPHA, and V(s)/V(p) averages. The illustrations generally suggest negative relations of
media coverage with SYNCH and V(s)/V(p) and positive relations of media coverage with PIN and ALPHA.
We obtain similar patterns when using MediaCov2 to measure media coverage. These results are generally
consistent with H1a that media coverage reduces stock price synchronicity, H1b that media coverage increases
the probability of informed trading, and H1c that the media coverage reduces the deviation of a stock price
from random walk. Taken together, they are consistent with the view that more intensive media coverage is
associated with higher price eﬃciency for Chinese stocks.4.2. The impact of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency
H1a concerns the impact of media coverage on the ability of stock prices to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation, measured by stock price synchronicity (SYNCH), while H1b and H1c re-examine H1a, focusing on
the impact of media coverage on the amount of private ﬁrm-speciﬁc available, measured by the probability18 For example, Gul et al. (2010) report that the mean R2 for their Chinese sample is about 45%, whereas Piotroski and Roulstone (2004)
report a much lower mean R2 of 19.3% for their U.S. sample.
Table 1
Media sample characteristics.
Year No. of
ﬁrms
No. of articles as measured by
MediaCov1
No. of articles as measured by
MediaCov2
Average media coverage
MediaCov1 per
ﬁrm
MediaCov2 per
ﬁrm
Panel A: by year
2000 285 30,780 5700 108 20
2001 707 108,171 21,917 153 31
2002 804 106,128 27,336 132 34
2003 893 175,921 40,185 197 45
2004 1019 106,995 23,437 105 23
2005 1086 280,188 65,160 258 60
2006 1144 323,752 85,800 283 75
2007 1158 279,078 68,322 241 59
2008 1256 385,592 79,128 307 63
2009 1261 254,722 63,050 202 50
Total 9613 2,114,860 499,876 220 52
Industry No. of ﬁrms Average media coverage
MediaCov1 per ﬁrm MediaCov2 per ﬁrm
Panel B: by industry
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 192 181 40
Mining 144 312 66
Manufacturing 5168 213 50
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 439 202 47
Construction 167 215 60
Transportation 364 265 65
Communication 571 238 63
Wholesale and Retail Trade 729 219 53
Real Estate 705 242 55
Public Utility 335 218 66
Culture, Sport and Entertainment 88 255 43
Conglomerate 711 214 47
Total 9613 220 52
This table presents average media coverage distributions as measured by number of newspaper articles.
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pricing error (V(s)/V(p)). To test H1a, H1b, and H1c, we specify the following regression:StockPriceEfficiency ¼ a0 þ a1MediaCoverage þ
X
k
akControlk þ ðerrorÞ ð1Þwhere the dependent variable, StockPriceEﬃciency, refers to the pricing eﬃciency of stocks. When testing
H1a, StockPriceEﬃciency is proxied by SYNCH, which is inversely related to the ability of stock price to
incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. When testing H1b, StockPriceEﬃciency is proxied by PIN, which has
a direct relation with the probability of informed trading in a stock. When testing H1c, StockPriceEﬃciency
is proxied by V(s)/V(p), which is positively related to the extent to which a stock price deviates from
random walk. In Eq. (1), we measure the extent of media coverage about a ﬁrm using two alternative proxies:
Ln(MediaCov1) and Ln(MediaCov2). Given the positive relation betweenMedia Coverage and StockPriceEﬃ-
ciency, H1a translates as a1 < 0 when Eq. (1) is estimated with StockPriceEﬃciency = SYNCH. H1b translates
as a1 > 0 when Eq. (1) is estimated with StockPriceEﬃciency = PIN. H1c translates as a1 < 0 when Eq. (1) is
estimated with StockPriceEﬃciency = V(s)/V(p).
Following previous related research (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Boehmer and
Kelley, 2009; Gul et al., 2010; Ferreira et al., 2011), we include a set of control variables in our regressions.
These variables are ﬁrm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), earnings volatility (STDROA), market-to-book ratio
(M/B), the number of ﬁrms in the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs (INDNUM), the size of the industry
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std dev. N
Panel A: PIN and synchronicity
PIN 0.1085 0.1383 0.1398 0.1734 0.0600 9613
ALPHA 0.2710 0.3304 0.3340 0.4038 0.1259 9613
SYNCH 0.8812 0.4193 0.3939 0.0789 0.7035 9316
R2 0.2929 0.4082 0.4027 0.5197 0.1635 9316
V(s)/V(p) 0.0705 0.1156 0.1070 0.1486 0.0531 9316
Panel B: Variables of interest used in the main regression
MediaCov1 95 220 156 276 182.77 9613
MediaCov2 15 52 32 62 56.71 9613
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0913 0.1013 0.1011 0.1125 0.0181 9613
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0555 0.0693 0.0699 0.0829 0.0213 9613
Inst_General 6.11 7.78 7.66 9.55 2.163 9613
Inst_Gov 7.52 8.49 8.64 9.80 1.498 9613
Inst_Private 6.39 8.49 8.93 10.29 2.823 9613
Inst_Protectionism 8.90 9.50 10.29 10.77 1.831 9613
Inst_Financial 6.33 7.90 8.07 10.01 2.156 9613
Inst_Law 4.32 7.09 5.96 9.42 3.443 9613
Panel C: Other explanatory variables
PrivateFirm 0 0.317 0 1 0.465 9613
B_SHARE 0 0.081 0 0 0.272 9613
H_SHARE 0 0.024 0 0 0.153 9613
Big_4 0 0.063 0 0 0.245 9613
ANALYST 0 1.075 0.693 2.079 1.217 9613
AD 0.017 0.059 0.037 0.072 0.051 9613
Panel D: Control variables
SIZE 20.628 21.323 21.271 21.978 0.9546 9613
LEV 0.3861 0.5213 0.5281 0.6583 0.1851 9613
M/B 1.0467 1.5076 1.2677 1.7522 0.6328 9613
INDNUM 4.2341 4.5641 4.5218 4.9698 0.5567 9613
INDSIZE 25.887 26.477 26.453 27.088 0.8489 9613
STDROA 0.0133 0.0458 0.0261 0.0568 0.0489 9613
VOL 0.0448 0.1113 0.0875 0.1563 0.0787 9613
All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A.
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to account for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 3 presents the results on the impact of media coverage on the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
incorporated into stock prices. As shown, where SYNCH is used as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcients on both media coverage measures are highly signiﬁcant with an expected negative sign at less
than the 1% level. This is consistent with H1a, suggesting that a greater amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is
incorporated into the stock prices of ﬁrms with high media coverage than those with low coverage.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results using PIN as the dependent variable. As shown in Panel A, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcients on both media coverage measures are also highly signiﬁcant with an expected positive sign
at less than the 1% level. This is consistent with H1b. One concern with using PIN as a proxy of private ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information is that it reﬂects both the probability of a private information event occurring (ALPHA)
and trade order ﬂows. To alleviate this concern, we discompose PIN into ALPHA and trade order ﬂows. Panel
B of Table 4 reports the results using ALPHA as the proxy for the amount of private ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
available in the market. As shown in Panel B, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of both media coverage measures are
highly signiﬁcant with an expected positive sign at less than the 1% level. These ﬁndings support the following
view: Media coverage encourages information arbitrageurs to process more public information into value-
relevant private information, and/or to collect and produce more private information.
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Figure 1. The ﬁgures illustrate the relation between media coverage in deciles and the corresponding synchronicity averages, the relation
between media coverage in deciles and the corresponding PIN (ALPHA) averages, and the relation between media coverage in deciles and
the corresponding V(s)/V(p). All variables are deﬁned in Appendix A.
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Table 3
Media coverage and synchronicity.
Dependent variable = SYNCH (1) (2)
Constant 2.8220 -3.1383
(4.82)*** (5.32)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 6.479
(9.32)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 3.432
(6.79)***
SIZE 0.1833 0.1719
(13.54)*** (12.51)***
LEV 0.0101 0.0122
(1.80)* (2.32)***
M/B 0.0087 0.0091
(1.36) (1.39)
INDNUM 0.0350 0.0252
(0.86) (0.61)
INDSIZE 0.0200 0.0135
(0.69) (0.46)
STDROA 0.2541 0.2727
(3.25)*** (3.34)***
VOL 1.4290 1.440
(9.41)*** (9.38)***
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9316 9316
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.389
This table presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by synchronicity. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
94 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 83–114Table 5 presents the results on the impact of media coverage on stock pricing error. As shown, where
V(s)/V(p) is used as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on both media coverage measures
are highly signiﬁcant with an expected negative sign at less than the 1% level. This is consistent with H1c,
suggesting a smaller deviation from random walk for stock prices of ﬁrms with high media coverage than
those with low coverage.
In short, the results from Tables 3–5 suggest the media coverage is able to increase stock price eﬃciency by
increasing the ability of stock price to incorporate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and the probability of having pri-
vate ﬁrm-speciﬁc information available as well as reducing the deviation of a stock price from the eﬃcient
price.
4.3. Endogeneity
In the regressions speciﬁed above, we implicitly assume that stock price synchronicity, the probability of
informed trading, and stock pricing error are inﬂuenced by media coverage. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that
a stock (or the ﬁrm behind it) is able to aﬀect media coverage by newspapers across the entire country. The
ﬁrm behind a stock cannot decide the amount of media coverage it receives at any point in time. For example,
there is no compelling reason to believe that ﬁrms with low stock price synchronicity are more or less able to
attract media attention. Therefore, the results reported in Tables 3–5 are unlikely to be driven by reverse
causality.1919 Engelberg and Parsons (2011), for example, ﬁnd that media coverage strongly predicts ﬁnancial market activities rather than the
reverse.
Table 4
Media coverage, PIN, and ALPHA.
Dependent variable = PIN (1) (2)
Panel A.: Media coverage and PIN
Constant 0.3665 0.3787
(8.08)*** (8.35)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.4850
(5.25)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.1492
(4.26)***
Size 0.0118 0.0116
(16.10)*** (15.58)***
LEV 0.00030 0.0002
(0.51) (0.48)
M/B 0.0021 0.0001
(1.70)* (1.67)*
INDNUM 0.0022 0.0025
(0.85) (0.93)
INDSIZE 0.0002 0.0010
(16.10)*** (0.12)
STDROA 0.0002 0.0021
(1.88)* (1.87)*
VOL 0.1687 0.168
(10.50)*** (10.45)***
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9613 9613
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.155
Dependent variable = ALPHA (1) (2)
Panel B: Media coverage and ALPHA
Constant 0.4542*** 0.5149***
(4.19) (4.71)
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0110***
(4.85)
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0073***
(4.19)
SIZE 0.0238*** 0.0247***
(10.41) (11.08)
LEV 0.0099 0.0110
(1.24) (1.38)
M/B 0.0220*** 0.0234***
(5.73) (6.28)
INDNUM 0.0033 0.0032
(0.57) (0.55)
INDSIZE 0.0098** 0.0100**
(2.10) (2.13)
STDROA 0.1522*** 0.1573***
(4.65) (4.80)
VOL 0.1209*** 0.1404***
(3.39) (4.00)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
N 9613 9613
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.131
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency as measured by PIN. The
variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency as measured by ALPHA. The
variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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Table 5
Media coverage and stock pricing error.
Dependent variable = V(s)/V(p) (1) (2)
Constant 0.5116*** 0.5003***
(17.31) (16.68)
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0033***
(4.06)
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0032***
(5.04)
SIZE 0.0151*** 0.0147***
(21.48) (20.93)
LEV 0.0198*** 0.0199***
(6.77) (6.89)
M/B 0.0024* 0.0026**
(1.93) (2.07)
INDNUM 0.0024 0.0025
(1.27) (1.33)
INDSIZE 0.0027** 0.0028**
(2.16) (2.24)
STDROA 0.0179 0.0129
(1.44) (1.03)
VOL 0.1754*** 0.1778***
(21.15) (21.73)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
N 9316 9316
Adjusted R2 0.672 0.675
This table presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by stock pricing error. The variables are as deﬁned in
Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is
clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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this concern, we address the possible endogeneity problem using a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). To conduct a PSM analysis, we construct a reduced sample that consists of the
sub-group of stocks with the highest 20% media coverage (high media coverage stocks, coded as 1) and a sub-
group of stocks with the lowest 50% media coverage (low media coverage stocks, coded as 0). Using this
reduced sample, we ﬁrst estimate a probit model in which the likelihood of a stock getting high media coverage
is linked to ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables that are deemed to aﬀect the media coverage. Dyck et al. (2008) suggest that
the level of media interest in a ﬁrm is determined by ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes. Since these attributes are likely to
correlate with dimensional characteristics that distinguish one ﬁrm from another, we include the following
variables in the probit model: size (SIZE), risk (Lev), growth prospects (M/B), earnings volatility (STDROA),
trading volume of its stock (VOL), the number of ﬁrms in the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs (INDNUM),
and the size of the industry to which the ﬁrm belongs (INDSIZE). Year and industry dummies are also
included to account for year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Using this probit model, we obtain the predicted likelihood of a stock getting high media coverage, i.e., the
propensity score, for each stock. Based on this score and using the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching
method, we match stocks in the high media coverage group with stocks from the low media coverage group.
When media coverage is measured as MediaCov1 (MediaCov2), the mean allowable range of likelihood
between a high media coverage stock and its PSM low media coverage match is 0.13% (0.15%), with the
maximum at 3.2% (8.8%). By construction, in our PSM sample, a high media coverage stock and its
PSM-matched, low media coverage stock are identical with respect to the predicted likelihood of media
coverage, and thus, are equally likely ex ante to receive the same amount of media coverage (although they
Table 6
Propensity Score Method (PSM) analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DSYNCH DPIN DALPHA DV(s)/V(p)
Panel A: Media coverage = MediaCov1
Constant 0.1026 0.0224*** 0.0583** 0.0029
(1.26) (2.75) (2.22) (0.66)
D Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0546* 0.0050** 0.0142** 0.0081***
(1.88) (2.37) (2.21) (4.62)
DSIZE 0.1570*** 0.0237*** 0.0034 0.0249***
(4.43) (7.92) (0.40) (13.81)
DLEV 0.5523*** 0.0135*** 0.0082 0.0196***
(6.67) (2.67) (0.63) (6.87)
DM/B 0.2346*** 0.0072*** 0.0077 0.0105***
(8.63) (3.51) (1.35) (8.36)
DINDNUM 0.0868*** 0.0070** 0.0185** 0.0106***
(2.59) (2.01) (2.14) (4.55)
DINDSIZE 0.0943*** 0.0049* 0.0162** 0.0115***
(4.26) (1.91) (2.50) (7.88)
DSTDROA 0.2070 0.0272*** 0.0473** 0.0428***
(0.54) (3.33) (2.25) (8.39)
DVOL 0.8805*** 0.1954*** 0.0921* 0.2820***
(5.04) (11.00) (1.84) (25.56)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1863 1922 1922 1863
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.216 0.038 0.550
Panel B: Media coverage = MediaCov2
Constant 0.0477 0.0376*** 0.0221 0.0089**
(0.52) (4.45) (0.82) (2.45)
D Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0618*** 0.0064*** 0.0109** 0.0036**
(2.71) (3.27) (1.98) (2.06)
DSIZE 0.1536*** 0.0231*** 0.0181* 0.0243***
(4.51) (6.11) (1.76) (11.18)
DLEV 0.4052*** 0.0066 0.0272* 0.0034
(6.79) (1.14) (1.79) (1.10)
DM/B 0.1334*** 0.0095*** 0.0253*** 0.0108***
(6.09) (4.25) (3.93) (8.92)
DINDNUM 0.1227*** 0.0006 0.0014 0.0064***
(3.68) (0.20) (0.14) (2.77)
DINDSIZE 0.1525*** 0.0012 0.0091 0.0081***
(5.68) (0.49) (1.12) (4.56)
DSTDROA 0.1880 0.0169 0.0126 0.0186**
(1.47) (1.51) (0.41) (2.51)
DVOL 1.7743*** 0.2003*** 0.3070*** 0.3565***
(8.42) (9.68) (5.45) (27.84)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1863 1922 1922 1863
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.183 0.075 0.490
The matches for the sub-group of stocks with the highest 20% media coverage (high media coverage stocks, coded as 1) are selected from
the sub-group of stocks with the lowest 50% media coverage (low media coverage stocks, coded as 0) using PSM. The panels below present
the regression results of the impact of the ex post diﬀerence between matching pairs in actual media coverage on the diﬀerence in SYNCH,
PIN, ALPHA, and V(s)/V(p). Note that a high media coverage stock and its low media coverage match are PSM identical and thus equally
likely ex ante to receive the same media coverage. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in
parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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coverage, if any, is likely to be exogenous.
Using this reduced PSM sample of matching pairs, we repeat our regression analyses reported in Tables 3–5
by regressing the diﬀerences between pairs in SYNCH, PIN, ALPHA, and V(s)/V(p), respectively on the dif-
ferences between pairs in actual ex post media coverage (both measures) and in the controls. The results are
reported in Panels A (for MediaCov1) and B (for MediaCov2) of Table 6. As shown in Panels A and B, the
PSM-estimated coeﬃcients of both media coverage variables are signiﬁcant for the four dependent variables
and with the expected signs. This is consistent with our full sample results reported in Tables 3–5. Our PSM
results reported in Panels A and B of Table 6, taken together, suggest that our main results in Tables 3–5 are
unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity bias. The PSM results lend further support to H1a, H1b, and
H1c that media coverage improves the pricing eﬃciency of stocks.4.4. Variations in liquidity
Although all our regressions have been adjusted for trade volume (VOL), we carry out additional analysis
to assess whether variations in liquidity drive our results. We do this by dividing the sample into liquid and
illiquid sub-samples. The lack of liquidity or illiquidity is measured by the ratio of the daily absolute return to
the RMB trade volume, averaged for each year. This illiquidity ratio gives the absolute (percentage) price
change per RMB of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order ﬂow. A stock is classiﬁed
as liquid (illiquid) if its illiquidity ratio is below (above) the median ratio in the whole sample. We then re-
estimate the regressions of Tables 3–5 in these two sub-samples. The estimated coeﬃcients of media coverage
(both measures) with SYNCH, PIN, ALPHA, and V(s)/V(p), respectively, as dependent variables for liquid
and illiquid sub-samples are reported in Table 7. As shown, the media coverage coeﬃcients of all four depen-
dent variables remain signiﬁcant and of the correct signs. In other words, out results are unlikely to be driven
by variations in liquidity.4.5. Robustness
Our regression analyses thus far include a set of seven control variables (SIZE, LEV, M/B, INDNUM,
INDSIZE, STDROA, and VOL). We now include six additional control variables to alleviate concern about
omitted correlated variables. Using a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms, Gul et al. (2010) ﬁnd that stock price syn-Table 7
High liquidity versus low liquidity.
Dependent variables Low liquidity High liquidity
Ln(MediaCov1) Ln(MediaCov2) Ln(MediaCov1) Ln(MediaCov2)
SYNCH 0.1479*** 0.0717*** 0.1646*** 0.0630***
(6.24) (3.95) (5.78) (3.32)
PIN 0.0054*** 0.0028* 0.0078*** 0.0030**
(2.81) (1.90) (3.89) (2.00)
ALPHA 0.0164*** 0.0082* 0.0144*** 0.0068**
(2.67) (1.86) (3.35) (2.36)
V(s)/V(p) 0.0060*** 0.0047*** 0.0061*** 0.0043***
(3.33) (3.46) (4.47) (3.54)
This table presents the estimated coeﬃcients of media coverage from regressions using SYNCH, PIN, ALPHA, and V(s)/V(p), respec-
tively, as dependent variables in sub-samples divided according to illiquidity. The lack of liquidity or illiquidity of a stock is measured by
the ratio of the daily absolute return to the RMB trade volume, averaged for each year. This illiquidity ratio gives the absolute (percentage)
price change per RMB of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order ﬂow. A stock is classiﬁed as a high liquidity (low
liquidity) stock if its illiquidity ratio is below (above) the median ratio in the whole sample. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
Table 8
Media coverage, synchronicity, PIN, stock price error and other explanatory variables.
Dependent variable = SYNCH (1) (2)
Panel A: Synchronicity
Constant 2.2851 2.5945
(3.79)*** (4.29)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 6.0599
(8.74)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 2.9879
(5.95)***
PrivateFirm 0.0439 0.0481
(1.73)* (1.87)*
B_SHARE 0.0468 0.0389
(1.30) (1.05)
H_SHARE 0.1167 0.1287
(2.04)** (2.14)**
Big_4 0.02153 0.0331
(0.65) (0.97)
Ln (ANALYST) 0.0046 0.0119
(0.39) (0.98)
AD 0.5792 0.6056
(3.70)*** (3.87)***
SIZE 0.1808 0.1721
(11.64)*** (10.88)***
LEV 0.0091 0.0106
(01.56) (1.93)*
M/B 0.0082 0.0084
(1.29) (1.30)
INDNUM 0.0494 0.0413
(1.22) (1.01)
INDSIZE 0.0393 0.0343
(1.36) (1.19)
STDROA 0.2445 0.2608
(3.20)* (3.27)*
VOL 1.456 1.484
(9.80)*** (9.89)***
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9316 9316
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.392
Dependent variable = PIN (1) (2)
Panel B: PIN
Constant 0.3326 0.3473
(7.05)*** (7.37)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.2622
(5.42)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.1538
(4.20)***
PrivateFirm 0.0027 0.0028
(1.58) (1.67)*
B_SHARE 0.0070 0.0070
(2.92)*** (2.86)***
H_SHARE 0.001 0.0013
(0.15) (0.31)
Big_4 0.000 0.000
(.0.17) (0.10)
Ln (ANALYST) 0.0051 0.0048
(5.00)*** (4.73)***
(continued on next page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Dependent variable = PIN (1) (2)
AD 0.0028 0.0031
(0.28) (0.29)
SIZE 0.0093 0.0091
(10.63)*** (10.33)***
LEV 0.0000 0.0000
(0.25) (0.26)
M/B 0.0002 0.0001
(1.66)* (1.66)*
INDNUM 0.0031 0.0033
(1.17) (1.26)
INDSIZE 0.0006 0.0007
(0.31) (0.36)
STDROA 0.0002 0.0002
(1.88)* (1.87)*
VOL 0.1776 0.168
(10.92)*** (10.45)***
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9613 9613
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.159
Dependent variable = ALPHA (1) (2)
Panel C: ALPHA
Constant 0.4199*** 0.3273***
(3.69) (2.84)
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0079***
(3.40)
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0058***
(3.28)
PrivateFirm 0.0021 0.0016
(0.57) (0.43)
B_SHARE 0.0014 0.0017
(0.89) (0.83)
H_SHARE 0.0105 0.0103
(0.80) (0.90)
Big_4 0.0028 0.0027
(0.42) (0.40)
Ln (ANALYST) 0.0102*** 0.0093***
(4.09) (3.76)
AD 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(8.96) (8.32)
SIZE 0.0274*** 0.0267***
(10.02) (9.66)
LEV 0.0121 0.0107
(1.33) (1.17)
M/B 0.0167*** 0.0175***
(3.57) (3.72)
INDNUM 0.0078 0.0081
(1.58) (1.62)
INDSIZE 0.0039 0.0045
(0.84) (0.97)
STDROA 0.1423*** 0.1412***
(3.80) (3.72)
VOL 0.0604 0.0483
(1.38) (1.11)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9613 9613
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.128
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Table 8 (continued)
Dependent variable = V(s)/V(p) (1) (2)
Panel D: V(s)/V(p)
Constant 0.5819*** 0.5756***
(16.67) (16.42)
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0020***
(2.61)
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0021***
(3.40)
PrivateFirm 0.0001 0.0001
(0.04) (0.12)
B_SHARE 0.0056 0.0058
(1.27) (1.30)
H_SHARE 0.0057 0.0055
(1.44) (1.41)
Big_4 0.0012 0.0013
(0.53) (0.58)
Ln (ANALYST) 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(4.56) (4.55)
AD 0.0001 0.0001
(0.71) (0.11)
SIZE 0.0163*** 0.0161***
(17.89) (17.59)
LEV 0.0216*** 0.0216***
(6.95) (6.92)
M/B 0.0052*** 0.0052***
(3.68) (3.73)
INDNUM 0.0029 0.0029
(1.40) (1.44)
INDSIZE 0.0028* 0.0029**
(1.94) (1.99)
STDROA 0.0035 0.0044
(0.49) (0.62)
VOL 0.0770*** 0.0779***
(8.48) (8.63)
Industry & year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9316 9316
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.663
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by SYNCH with the inclusion of other explanatory variables.
The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in
parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by PIN with the inclusion of other explanatory variables. The
variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses.
Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel C presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by ALPHA with the inclusion of other explanatory variables.
The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in
parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel D presents regression results of the eﬀects of media coverage on stock price
eﬃciency as measured by V(s)/V(p) with the inclusion of other explanatory variables.
The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Absolute values of z are reported in
parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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Table 9
Media coverage, stock price synchronicity, and institutional development.
Dependent variable = SYNCH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Synchronicity and MediaCov1
Constant 3.3563 3.0673 3.4235 3.0975 3.3246 3.4911
(5.40)*** (4.62)*** (5.64)*** (4.85)*** (5.43)*** (5.83)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 5.6136 9.9233 5.7884 8.7713 6.3348 3.6719
(3.20)*** (3.61)*** (3.78)*** (3.18)*** (3.72)*** (3.31)***
Inst_General 0.0483
(2.15)***
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.4717
(2.25)***
Inst_Gov 0.0833
(2.50)***
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.9497
(3.01)***
Inst_Private 0.0412
(2.37)***
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.4548
(2.74)***
Inst_Protectionism
0.0594
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov1) (2.13)**
0.7647
Inst_Financial (2.68)***
0.0529
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov1) (2.54)***
0.5632
Inst_Law (2.75)***
0.0289
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov1) (2.08)**
0.2433
(1.90)*
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7972 7972 7972 7972 7972 7972
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.505 0.502 0.505
Panel B: Synchronicity and MediaCov2
Constant 3.3238 3.1998 3.2969 3.2775 3.2825 3.2943
(5.50)*** (5.32)*** (5.64)*** (5.59)*** (5.62)*** (5.67)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 2.4322 5.6343 2.7662 4.2813 2.8758 0.9435
(1.89)* (2.94)*** (2.48)*** (2.36)*** (2.31)*** (1.16)
Inst_General 0.0253
(2.09)**
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.3463
(2.19)**
Inst_Gov 0.0356
(2.08)**
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.6970
(3.12)***
Inst_Private 0.0206
(2.20)**
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.3590
(2.87)***
Inst_Protectionism 0.0156
(1.16)
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.4988
(2.63)***
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Table 9 (continued)
Dependent variable = SYNCH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inst_Financial 0.0239
(2.19)***
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.3977
(2.61)***
Inst_Law 0.0160
(2.10)**
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.1653
(1.70)*
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7972 7972 7972 7972 7972 7972
Adjusted R2 0.502 0.501 0.503 0.506 0.503 0.505
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov1 (lagged one period) on SYNCH across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov2 (lagged one period) on SYNCH across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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issue B-shares for foreign investors (traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges) and H-shares
traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Their study also ﬁnds that synchronicity is lower for Big
4-audited ﬁrms. Following their study, we now additionally include in Eq. (1) four indicator variables: (1)
Private Firm equal to 1 for non-government controlled ﬁrms and 0 for government controlled ﬁrms; (2)
B-SHARE equal to 1 for ﬁrms with both A- and B-shares; (3) H-SHARE equal to 1 for ﬁrms with both
A- and H-shares; and (4) Big 4 equal to 1 for ﬁrms with Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise.
Chan and Hameed (2006) show that analyst following is positively associated with synchronicity in emerg-
ing markets. To further check the sensitivity of our results, we also control for the intensity of analyst coverage
of a ﬁrm by including Ln (ANALYST). One may argue that a ﬁrm’s exposure to media (as well as the ability to
attract analyst attention) could be positively associated with the intensity of a ﬁrm’s advertising activities. In
an attempt to isolate the media coverage eﬀects on ﬁrm-speciﬁc information ﬂow from advertising (and ana-
lyst coverage), we also include the AD variable, which is measured by the ratio of a ﬁrm’s selling expenses to
sales. Panels of A, B, C, and D of Table 8 present the regression results after including the six additional con-
trol variables mentioned above.
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, when SYNCH is used as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcients on both
media coverage variables are highly signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level with an expected negative sign. This
suggests that our main results are robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables. The
synchronicity-reducing impact of media coverage holds even after the additional control variables are
accounted for. The following is noteworthy with respect to the additional control variables: First, we ﬁnd that
the coeﬃcient on Private Firm is negative and marginally signiﬁcant at less than the 10% level. This suggests
that synchronicity is lower for non-government controlled ﬁrms than for government controlled ﬁrms, a ﬁnd-
ing consistent with Gul et al. (2010). Second, we ﬁnd that synchronicity is signiﬁcantly lower for A-share ﬁrms
that also issue H-shares for investors in the Hong Kong stock market. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of
Gul et al. (2010). Third, consistent with our previous ﬁndings, we ﬁnd that synchronicity is lower for ﬁrms
with higher advertising expenditures. Finally, the coeﬃcients on other control variables are, overall, qualita-
tively identical with those reported in Panel A of Table 3.
Table 10
Media coverage, PIN, and institutional development.
Dependent variable = PIN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: PIN and MediaCov1
Constant 0.2355 0.1973 0.2429 0.1868 0.2442 0.2696
(4.71)*** (3.73)*** (4.95)*** (3.57)*** (4.92)*** (5.36)***
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.4023 0.6493 0.2717 0.7939 0.3247 0.2350
(2.76)*** (3.01)*** (2.25)*** (4.06)*** (2.35)*** (2.49)***
Inst_General 0.0048
(2.59)***
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0422
(2.31)***
Inst_Gov 0.0083
(3.14)***
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0687
(2.68)***
Inst_Private 0.0033
(2.31)***
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0235
(1.70)*
Inst_Protectionism 0.0092
(4.20)***
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0780
(3.64)***
Inst_Financial 0.0038
(2.16)***
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0318
(1.80)*
Inst_Law 0.0023
(1.84)*
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0215
(1.83)*
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.250 0.251 0.252 0.249 0.250
Panel B: PIN and MediaCov2
Constant 0.2463 0.2176 0.2470 0.2223 0.2504 0.2646
(5.07)*** (4.38)*** (5.11)*** (4.50)*** (5.17)*** (5.50)***
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.3449 0.5816 0.2405 0.5798 0.3213 0.1985
(2.86)*** (3.32)*** (2,38)*** (4.02)*** (2.81)*** (2.65)***
Inst_General 0.0033
(3.01)***
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0389
(2.57)***
Inst_Gov 0.0059
(3.32)***
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0646
(3.12)***
Inst_Private 0.0025
(3.08)***
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0242
(2.10)***
Inst_Protectionism 0.0053
(4.54)***
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0597
(3.76)***
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Table 10 (continued)
Dependent variable = PIN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inst_Financial 0.0031
(3.03)***
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0355
(2.48)***
Inst_Law 0.0016
(2.24)***
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0209
(2.21)***
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year and industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.252 0.253 0.251 0.252 0.251
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov1 (lagged one period) on PIN across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov2 (lagged one period) on PIN across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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both media coverage variables are signiﬁcantly positive at less than the 1% level. This suggests that our results
reported in Panel B of Table 3 are robust to the inclusion of the additional control variables.
The PIN-increasing eﬀect of media coverage holds even after controlling for additional determinants of the
probability of informed trading. With respect to the estimated coeﬃcients on the newly included control
variables, the following are apparent: First, the amount and availability of private information is greater
for Chinese A-share ﬁrms that simultaneously issue B-shares for foreign investors than for A-share only ﬁrms.
Second, consistent with the ﬁnding of Chan and Hameed (2006), the coeﬃcient on ANALYST is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting that the ﬂow of private information about a ﬁrm is lower for ﬁrms with higher analyst as
follows. This is in line with the view that analysts engage more in the acquisition and dissemination of com-
mon information than ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, thereby facilitating the ﬂow of common information in
emerging markets such as China. Finally, the coeﬃcients on other control variables are, overall, qualitatively
identical with those reported in Panel B of Table 3.
As shown in Panel C (D), the results of the ALPHA (V(s)/V(p)) regression against the same set of test and
control variables are, overall, similar to those reported in Panel B (A) where PIN (SYNCH) is used as the
dependent variable. We therefore do not repeat a full explanation of the regression results again, but we note
the following: these results lend further support to H1a, H1b, and H1c, that is, the notion that ﬁrm-level media
coverage can improve stock price eﬃciency in Chinese ﬁrms.
4.6. Media coverage and non-media institutional development
Consistent with H1a, H1b, and H1c our results provide strong and robust evidence that media coverage
generally increases stock price eﬃciency. However, it is not clear whether the media substitutes/compensates
for or complements other non-media institutions, which are underdeveloped in China (Allen et al., 2005).
Building on the law and ﬁnance literature (La Porta et al., 1998), we examine whether the media in China
can play the role of compensating for the relatively underdeveloped non-media investor protection institu-
tions. Speciﬁcally, we expect the eﬀect of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency to be stronger in countries
or regions of relatively weaker institutional infrastructures (H2).
Table 11
Media coverage, ALPHA, and institutional development.
Dependent variable = ALPHA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: ALPHA and MediaCov1
Constant 0.7125*** 0.7818*** 0.7075*** 0.8542*** 0.0718 0.2003**
(6.87) (7.05) (6.99) (8.03) (0.95) (2.05)
Ln (MediaCov1) 0.0244*** 0.0349*** 0.0214*** 0.0483*** 0.0282*** 0.0231***
(3.80) (3.61) (4.05) (5.93) (6.36) (5.49)
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0016*
(1.91)
Inst_General 0.0083**
(1.96)
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0027**
(2.33)
Inst_Gov 0.0150**
(2.55)
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0011*
(1.80)
Inst_Private 0.0065**
(2.10)
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0040***
(4.40)
Inst_Protectionism 0.0209***
(4.68)
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0011*
(1.79)
Inst_Financial 0.0047
(1.39)
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0009*
(1.67)
Inst_Law 0.0036
(1.25)
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514 8514
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.137 0.092 0.092
Panel B: ALPHA and MediaCov2
Constant 0.5295*** 0.5810*** 0.5276*** 0.5921*** 0.0544 0.5020***
(5.62) (6.00) (5.65) (6.15) (0.82) (5.38)
Ln (MediaCov2) 0.0218*** 0.0335*** 0.0190*** 0.0337*** 0.0227*** 0.0145***
(3.86) (3.96) (4.05) (4.84) (6.08) (4.09)
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0019***
(2.65)
Inst_General 0.0059**
(2.38)
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0031***
(3.16)
Inst_Gov 0.0108***
(3.11)
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0014***
(2.71)
Inst_Private 0.0052***
(2.89)
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0030***
(3.94)
Inst_Protectionism 0.0106***
(4.12)
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Table 11 (continued)
Dependent variable = ALPHA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0009*
(1.78)
Inst_Financial 0.0022
(1.13)
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0010**
(2.21)
Inst_Law 0.0028*
(1.69)
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8464 8464 8464 8464 7899 8464
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.133 0.087 0.132
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov1 (lagged one period) on ALPHA across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov2 (lagged one period) on ALPHA across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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across diﬀerent provinces in China. For this purpose, we estimate the following regressions:StockPriceEfficiency ¼ b0 þ b1MediaCoverage þ b2InstitutionalDevelopment þ b3MediaCoverage
 InstitutionalDevelopment þ
X
k
bkControlk þ ðerrorÞ ð2Þwhere the dependent variable, StockPriceEﬃciency, refers to the pricing eﬃciency of stocks as in Eq. (1).
When testing H2a, StockPriceEﬃciency is proxied by SYNCH. When testing H2b, StockPriceEﬃciency is
proxied by PIN. When testing H2c, StockPriceEﬃciency is proxied by V(s)/V(p). We measure the extent of
media coverage about a ﬁrm using two alternative proxies: Ln(MediaCov1) and Ln(MediaCov2). In Eqs.
(2), H2a and H2c are supported if b1 < 0 and b3 > 0 when the dependent variable is SYNCH or V(s)/V(p).
H2b is supported if b1 > 0 and b3 < 0 when the dependent variable is PIN or ALPHA.
Table 9 presents the regression results for Eq. (2), where SYNCH is used as the proxy for stock price eﬃ-
ciency. In Panel A, media coverage is measured by Ln(MediaCov1), while in Panel B, it is measured by Ln
(MediaCov2). We use six diﬀerent measures of institutional development constructed by Fan et al. (2009)
and described in Section IV C to proxy for the relative non-media institutional development in a region.
Results from both Panels A and B of Table 9 show that the eﬀect of media coverage on mitigating synchronic-
ity remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant (with one exception, in model 6 of Panel B) even after control-
ling for the strength of regional institutional infrastructures and their interaction with media coverage. This
result lends further support for our earlier ﬁnding that media coverage facilitates incorporation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information into stock prices, thus mitigating synchronicity. In addition, the coeﬃcients on each
of six non-media institutional development proxies are all negative and signiﬁcant for all cases except one
(column 4 in Panel B) in both panels. This ﬁnding suggests that stocks of ﬁrms in regions with more developed
non-institutions are less synchronous. This cross-regional evidence within China is consistent with the
cross-country evidence reported in Morck et al. (2000) and Kim and Shi (2012).
Table 12
Media coverage, V(s)/V(p), and institutional development.
Dependent variable = V(s)/V(p) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: V(s)/V(p) and MediaCov1
Constant 0.5318*** 0.5392*** 0.5544*** 0.5764*** 0.5465*** 0.5472***
(19.82) (18.70) (21.07) (20.37) (20.66) (20.79)
Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0073*** 0.0102*** 0.0109*** 0.0153*** 0.0084*** 0.0091***
(3.26) (3.18) (6.86) (4.51) (6.36) (7.44)
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0005**
(2.04)
Inst_General 0.0027*
(1.95)
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0008**
(2.34)
Inst_Gov 0.0034*
(1.79)
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0007***
(4.12)
Inst_Private 0.0038***
(4.16)
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0013***
(3.94)
Inst_Protectionism 0.0072***
(4.53)
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0005***
(2.90)
Inst_Financial 0.0031***
(3.04)
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov1) 0.0006***
(3.93)
Inst_Law 0.0034***
(4.10)
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and Year Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8720 8720 8720 8720 8720 8720
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.675 0.672 0.676 0.672 0.672
Panel B: V(s)/V(p) and MediaCov2
Constant 0.5157*** 0.5199*** 0.5104*** 0.5369*** 0.5085*** 0.5079***
(19.49) (19.20) (19.48) (20.11) (19.35) (19.36)
Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0085*** 0.0120*** 0.0073*** 0.0128*** 0.0057*** 0.0059***
(4.61) (4.34) (4.45) (4.27) (4.72) (5.00)
Inst_General * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0007***
(3.14)
Inst_General 0.0023***
(2.79)
Inst_Gov * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0010***
(3.40)
Inst_Gov 0.0027**
(2.33)
Inst_Private * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0005***
(2.76)
Inst_Private 0.0014**
(2.23)
Inst_Protectionism * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0011***
(3.54)
Inst_Protectionism 0.0041***
(4.07)
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Table 12 (continued)
Dependent variable = V(s)/V(p) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inst_Financial * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0004**
(2.34)
Inst_Financial 0.0014**
(2.23)
Inst_Law * Ln(MediaCov2) 0.0003***
(2.61)
Inst_Law 0.0013**
(2.47)
Other explanatory variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8720 8720 8720 8720 8720 8720
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.676 0.675 0.676 0.675 0.675
Panel A presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov1 (lagged one period) on V(s)/V(p) across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
Panel B presents regression results of the eﬀect of MediaCov2 (lagged one period) on V(s)/V(p) across regions of varying institutional
development. The variables are as deﬁned in Appendix A. Other explanatory variables and controls refer to those used in Table 8.
Absolute values of z are reported in parentheses. Standard error is clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance level at 1%.
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institutional development proxies are all positive and signiﬁcant across six columns in both panels. This
ﬁnding is consistent with H2, suggesting that the eﬀect of media coverage on mitigating stock price syn-
chronicity is signiﬁcantly stronger (weaker) in regions of relatively weaker (stronger) institutional
development.
Table 10 presents the regression results for Eq. (3), where PIN is used as the proxy for stock price eﬃ-
ciency. In Panel A, media coverage is measured by Ln(MediaCov1), while in Panel B, it is measured by Ln
(MediaCov2). As shown in Panels A and B of Table 10, the coeﬃcient on the media coverage variable is
signiﬁcant with an expected positive sign across all six columns in both panels. This ﬁnding lends further
support for our earlier ﬁnding: the main eﬀect of media coverage on increasing the probability of informed
trading remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant even after controlling for the strength of regional insti-
tutional infrastructures and their interaction with media coverage. Moreover, the coeﬃcients on each of six
regional non-media institutional development proxies are all signiﬁcantly positive across all six columns in
both panels. This ﬁnding suggests that stocks of ﬁrms located in regions with more developed non-media
institutions have signiﬁcantly higher PIN, and this result is robust to alternative measures of non-media
institutions in each region. Stated another way, we provide evidence suggesting that more ﬁrm-speciﬁc pri-
vate information is available for stocks of ﬁrms located in regions where non-media institutions are better
developed.
More importantly, coeﬃcients on the interaction between media coverage and each of six non-media
institutional development proxies are signiﬁcantly negative across six columns in both Panels A and B. This
ﬁnding is consistent with H2, suggesting that the eﬀect of media coverage on increasing PIN is signiﬁcantly
stronger (weaker) pronounced in regions of stronger (weaker) institutional development. In summary, the
results in Tables 8 and 9, taken together, suggest that the media contributes incrementally more to making
stock prices more informative in China, where non-media institutions are still less developed. One implica-
tion is that the media in China is able to compensate for other less developed non-media investor protection
institutions.
110 J.-B. Kim et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 83–114Tables 11 and 12 show regression results for Eq. (3), where ALPHA and V(s)/V(p) are used, respectively, as
proxies for stock price eﬃciency. Since results related to ALPHA (V(s)/V(p)) are consistent with those related
to PIN in Table 9 (with those related to SYNCH in Table 8), we will not repeat the same exposition here.
Suﬃce to say that the results from Tables 9–12, taken together, support our main hypothesis (H2) that the
impact of media coverage on stock price eﬃciency is greater in regions of weaker institutional development
within the 31 jurisdictions inside China.5. Concluding remarks
Based on a sample of over two million newspaper articles and using a large sample of ﬁrms listed in China’s
emerging stock markets, where ‘‘investor protection is weak and agency problems are severe” (Allen et al.,
2005, p. 90), this study investigates whether the commercialized state-owned media in China has an incremen-
tal impact on stock price eﬃciency. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that as
media coverage of a ﬁrm increases, its stock price synchronicity decreases. Second, we ﬁnd that as media cov-
erage of a ﬁrm increases, both the probability of informed trading and the probability of a private information
event occurring in its stock increase. Third, we ﬁnd that as media coverage of a ﬁrm increases, the extent to
which its stock price deviates from random walk decreases. These ﬁndings, taken together, suggest media cov-
erage improves the eﬃciency of stock prices. The above results are robust to potential endogeneity and reverse
causality as well as to variations in liquidity. Finally, we examine the relative impact of the media across 31
provinces/regions within China. We ﬁnd that the impact of the media on decreasing stock price synchronicity,
increasing the probability of informed trading, and reducing stock pricing error is stronger (weaker) in regions
of weaker (stronger) institutional development within China. This ﬁnding suggests that media coverage plays a
signiﬁcant role of compensating for the relatively underdeveloped governance institutions in transitional
economies such as China.
Overall, our results suggest that a commercialized and increasingly market-driven Chinese media can
increase stock price eﬃciency in China where standard governance institutions to protect investors and
maintain corporate transparency are weak. As the ﬁrst attempt to study the impact of the Chinese media
on stock prices, our results are preliminary. As such, they contain one caveat and raise two questions.
The caveat is that despite the market-driven commercialization, the watchdog eﬀect of the media would
soon cease should the Chinese government (or the Chinese Communist Party) consider curbing corrup-
tion and corporate fraud no longer a well-grounded state policy objective (a political survival strategy),
although such scenario is luckily unlikely. The ﬁrst question raised by our results is whether the impact
of this type of media (or a more independent media) on stock price eﬃciency will remain signiﬁcant in a
context when standard governance institutions are developed and strong.20 The second question is
whether the compensating role of the media relative to non-media institutions (where they are less devel-
oped) is general or speciﬁc only to the pricing eﬃciency of stocks. We leave these questions to future
research.Acknowledgments
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Dependent variables
SYNCH: natural logarithmic transformation of the world market model, computed as Log [R2/(1  R2)],
where R2 is the R2 of the model deﬁned in Appendix B.
PIN: probability of informed trading, computed based on the model deﬁned in Appendix B.
ALPHA: probability of a private information event occurring based on the model deﬁned in Appendix B.
V(s)/V(p): pricing error based on the model deﬁned Appendix B scaled by the standard deviation of
intraday (log) transaction prices.
Explanatory variables of interest
MediaCov1: the number of newspaper articles that mention the name of the ﬁrm.
MediaCov2: the number of newspaper articles in which the name of the ﬁrm in question is mentioned most
often (i.e., the number of times the name of the ﬁrm is mentioned is highest in an article relative to the
names of all other listed ﬁrms mentioned in the article).
Ln(MediaCov1): natural logarithmic transformation of MediaCov1 plus one scaled by two hundred.
Ln(MediaCov2): natural logarithmic transformation of MediaCov2 plus one scaled by two hundred.
Inst_General: score for overall development of market institutions in the region where the ﬁrm is
headquartered; a higher score indicates better development.
Inst_Gov: score for government intervention in markets in the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; a
higher score indicates lower government intervention.
Inst_Private: score of private enterprise development in the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; a higher
score indicates better private enterprise development.
Inst_Protectionism: score of regional protectionism in the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; a higher
score indicates lower regional protectionism.
Inst_Financial: score for ﬁnancial market development in the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; a
higher score indicates better ﬁnancial market development.
Inst_Law: score for legal environment in the region where the ﬁrm is headquartered; a higher score indicates
better legal environment.
Other explanatory variables
Private Firm: an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm is a private sector (rather than government-
owned or controlled) ﬁrm; zero otherwise.
B_SHARE: indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm also issues B-shares (denominated in US dollars and
set up for foreign investors), zero otherwise.
H_SHARE: indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm also lists on the Hong Kong stock exchange, zero
otherwise.
BIG_4: an indicator variable equal to one if the ﬁrm uses a Big 4 international auditor, zero otherwise.
Ln(ANALYST): natural logarithmic transformation of one plus the number of analysts following the ﬁrm,
zero otherwise.
AD: ratio of selling expense over sales, a proxy for advertising expense.
Control variables
SIZE: natural logarithmic transformation of the book value of a ﬁrm’s total assets.
LEV: ratio of total liability over total assets.
M/B: market-to-book equity ratio.
INDNUM: natural logarithmic transformation of the number of ﬁrms in the industry to which a ﬁrm
belongs.
INDSIZE: natural logarithmic transformation of year-end total assets of all sample ﬁrms in the industry to
which a ﬁrm belongs.
STDROA: standard deviation of Return-on-assets over the preceding ﬁve-year period, including the current
year.
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outstanding in a day.Appendix B. Estimation of SYNCH, PIN, and V(s) variables
SYNCH = Ln (R2/(1  R2)), where R2 is the R2 of a ﬁrm-year obtained from the following regression mod-
els during that ﬁrm-year:RET it ¼ aþ b1MKRET t þ b2WRDRET t þ eit
ðFirms with A-shares onlyÞ
RET it ¼ aþ b1MKRET t þ b2MKRET B þ b3WRDRET t þ eit
ðFirms with A- and B-sharesÞ
RET it ¼ aþ b1MKRET t þ b2MKRETH þ b3WRDRET t þ eit
ðFirms with A and H-sharesÞwhere, for ﬁrm i at day t, RETit is daily return of ﬁrm i trading in either Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange on
day t;MKRET is the value weighted market return, based on the domestic composite value weighted index of
shares (A-shares). WRDRET is the world market return computed using MSCI World Index.MKRETB is the
composite value weighted market index of B-shares (denominated in US dollars and set up for foreign inves-
tors). MKRETH is the value weighted Hong Kong market return using the value weighted Hang Seng index.PIN ¼ al
alþ eb þ eswhere a (ALPHA) is the probability of a private information event occurring; l is the arrival rate of informed
traders when an information event occurs; eb is the arrival rate of buy orders, and es is the arrival rate of sell
orders. Following Easley et al. (1996), these parameters are estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation
procedure, assuming a Poisson arrival process for informed and uninformed traders, and based on actual
information about daily buy and sell orders provided by CSMAR for the period 2000–2009. Note that using
actual buy and sell orders rather than algorithms to determine these orders increases the precision of our
estimates.
V(s) = the lower bound for the standard deviation of dispersion of pricing error, s, based on the model pro-
posed by Hasbrouck (1993) and used by Boehmer and Kelley (2009), where the (log) transaction stock price at
transaction time t, pt, is deﬁned to be the sum of a random component, mt, and a pricing error, st:pt ¼ mt þ st
whereas m, the random walk component represents the eﬃcient price, the pricing error, s, captures the extent
to which a transaction stock price deviates from its eﬃcient price. V(s) is estimated using a VAR system with
ﬁve lags over the ﬁrst diﬀerence in p and three trade variables: (1) a trade sign indicator, (2) signed trading
volume, and (3) the signed square root of trading volume. Following Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we sign
a trade by assuming that a trade is buyer initiated if the price is above the prevailing quote midpoint (and seller
initiated for the converse). V(s) is estimated for each stock in the sample for each year based on average weekly
trade orders of the stock in the year provided by CSMAR for the period 2000–2009.
Appendix C. From propaganda to commercialization: a discussion of the Chinese media
The media in China is an integral part of the government or of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The
Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee (Central Propaganda Department, or CPD) has been
responsible for the overall management of culture, including the mass media, in China since the early 1950s.
Most newspapers are administratively linked to the CCP. The CCP Central Committee, for example, publishes
People’s Daily. The model is replicated at local levels (e.g., Southern Daily is linked to Guangdong Provincial
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paper articles in China were no more than oﬃcial propaganda documents from the Party-state.
The commercialization of the Chinese media started in the late 1970s in tandem with economic reform for
two reasons. First, as the basis of legitimacy for CCP rule changed from one of communist ideology to one of
economic performance, the propaganda model of the media no longer suited the Party needs. Second, the
ﬁnancial burden of a nationwide propagandist media also proved too onerous for the government. Thus,
media commercialization had the dual aim of reducing state subsidies for the media and yet expanding the
media to further Party-state interests in economic development and social stability (Huang, 2001, 2007;
Liebman, 2005; Lin, 2006). As the state reduced subsidies, many newspapers had to ﬁnd other means toward
ﬁnancial self-suﬃciency. Continued state ownership, combined with the emphasis on proﬁtability, led to the
so-called ‘‘marketization” of the media. For example, the state-controlled Southern Daily Group, whose ﬂag-
ship Southern Daily remains the oﬃcial mouthpiece of the Guangdong Provincial Communist Party Commit-
tee, also publishes Southern Metropolitan Daily, a successful mass market tabloid with a high circulation, and
Southern Weekend, a weekly paper regarded as one of the most outspoken papers in China. With the exception
of the oﬃcial Southern Daily, which receives state support, other papers in the group are commercial newspa-
pers in that they must rely entirely on income generated from advertising and private subscription. A portion
of proﬁts from the commercially successful Southern Weekend and other commercial papers in the Group is
used to partly underwrite the cost of publishing the unproﬁtable mouthpiece Southern Daily.
Media commercialization represents a change in the media information paradigm. The number of newspa-
pers in China grew from 186 in 1978 to near 2000 in 2005, and most of them now operate without state sub-
sidies (Esarey, 2005; Lin, 2006). Competition is often ﬁerce between commercial newspapers within and across
regions, forcing newspapers to provide more and increasingly diversiﬁed information content to readers. The
near-complete ﬁnancial autonomy, the demand for credible and reliable information from the public, and
competition among news media force most newspapers in China to become responsive to the information
demands of the subscribing public. A newspaper with exclusively old-style propaganda reporting typically does
not have strong demand from the public. Because readership has become a crucial factor determining prof-
itability (or even survival), the market logic dictates that all commercial newspapers must now carry at least
some critical and investigative reporting to maintain and expand market share.
Notwithstanding the extensive commercialization, the media in China remains state-controlled and is sub-
ject to a range of extensive formal and informal regulations (Liebman, 2005). As a rule, any direct criticism of
the national CCP leadership, the central government, or the military is strictly oﬀ-limits. Any reporting that
frames these parties as the center of grievance is simply not allowed.21 Journalists could, however, get away
with criticizing regional government oﬃcials and corporations if the central government and the CCP leader-
ship are framed to be on the right side. Subject to formal and informal norms in China, a commercialized
newspaper caters to the demands of its reading public, on whom it relies for revenue. Although the media
avoids ideologically sensitive topics (e.g., democratic reform), it does enjoy a freer hand in exposing wrong-
doing at the regional or corporate level (Keatley, 2003). The commercialized ﬁnancial press (e.g., Caijing
Magazine) has been instrumental in exposing much corruption/fraud and numerous corporate scandals in
ﬁrms and ﬁnancial markets (Lin, 2006).22
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